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TOY GUNS DON’T KILL PEOPLE—PEOPLE KILL
PEOPLE WHO PLAY WITH TOY GUNS: FEDERAL
ATTEMPTS TO REGULATE IMITATION
FIREARMS IN THE FACE OF TOY
INDUSTRY OPPOSITION
Robert H. Wood*
I. INTRODUCTION
During class, a fifteen-year-old middle school student pulled
out what appeared to be a Beretta nine-millimeter handgun and
terrorized his classmates, who thought they were going to die in a
Columbine-style rampage.1 When police officers arrived and con-
fronted him, however, he fled to a bathroom and raised his hand-
gun as the officers approached. Reacting to the brandished
firearm, one of the officers fired, fatally wounding the boy. It was
later discovered that the handgun the student used was a non-fir-
ing toy replica.2 This scenario is just one of the many instances in
which toy weapons have been used in the commission of a crime,
and while the specific facts may differ, they often end with similarly
devastating results.3
The issue of the use of toy firearms first came to national at-
tention in August of 1987, when a disturbed man displaying a
weapon interrupted a live news broadcast on the set of KNBC-TV
in Los Angeles.4 The man forced television reporter David
Horowitz to read a statement regarding “space creatures and the
* Assistant Professor, Criminal Justice and Legal Studies Department, University
of Central Florida, teaching in the areas of administrative law, entertainment law, and
world legal studies. B.F.A., North Carolina School of the Arts, 1977; J.D., Georgia
State University College of Law, 1992; LL.M. (with Distinction), Tulane Law School,
1993. The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Dr. Cynthia Brown in the
preparation of this Article.
1 Shot Student is Brain Dead, NEWSDAY, Jan. 15, 2006, at A38 (describing Christo-
pher Penley, Florida middle school student, as holding a pellet gun in a school bath-
room when SWAT police officer fatally shot him).
2 Id.
3 See, e.g., Dennis Hevesi, Boy, 16, With Pellet Gun Is Killed by Officer, N.Y. TIMES,
March 25, 1995, at 29; Chris Conley, FBI Investigating Case in Child’s Killing, 12-year-old
Boy Was Shot by West Memphis Officer, MEMPHIS COMMERCIAL APPEAL, June 26, 2007, at
B1; Jack Leonard & Ari Bloomekatz, Inglewood Officers Identified, Eight are Named In the
Fatal Shooting of a Homeless Man, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2008, at 3.
4 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, TOY GUNS: INVOLVEMENT IN CRIME AND EN-
COUNTERS WITH THE POLICE 1 (1990) [hereinafter BJS SURVEY].
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CIA.” The weapon was later determined to be a toy pneumatic pis-
tol known as an “air soft” gun.5 This incident led Horowitz to
launch a campaign that resulted in legislation banning or regulat-
ing toy guns in California, New York, and twelve other states.6 Con-
gress also responded by enacting marking requirements for toy
weapons to assist in distinguishing them from genuine weapons.7
Despite these efforts, toy gun incidents continue to occur and
state and federal lawmakers continue to grapple with legislative so-
lutions, including prohibiting toy firearms in vehicles and banning
their sale at convenience stores, in their efforts to limit tragic oc-
currences like those described earlier.8 In fact, twenty-one laws lim-
iting fake guns have been enacted since 1990 and more are
pending.9
The purpose of this Article is to examine existing and pro-
posed federal law regulating the use of toy weapons and to discuss
analyses of the limited studies addressing the issue. Part II reviews
federal legislation and its implementation by federal agencies. Part
III addresses federal court decisions interpreting the use of toy and
replica weapons. Part IV discusses the few studies on the toy and
replica gun issues. Part V presents the author’s analysis of the effec-
tiveness of the legislation. Finally, Part VI questions the sufficiency
of existing data that support the flurry of legislative efforts, and
offers the author’s conclusions regarding additional research that
may be required to identify whether a persistent problem is
presented.
II. FEDERAL LEGISLATION & REGULATIONS
A. The Federal Toy Gun Law
Just over a year after the David Horowitz toy gun scare was
aired on national television,10 the first federal toy gun law was
tacked onto the end of the Federal Energy Management Improve-
ment Act of 1988.11 Section 4 of this Act created 15 U.S.C. § 5001,
with the title “Penalties for entering into commerce of imitation
5 Id.
6 Fight Back! With David Horowitz, http://www.fightback.com/about/history/
history.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2008).
7 15 U.S.C. § 5001 (2000).
8 Lucas L. Johnson II, Fake Guns Draw New Laws in Some States, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
May 4, 2008, at A17.
9 Id.
10 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
11 Federal Energy Management Improvement Act of 1988§ 4, Pub. L. No. 100-615,
102 Stat. 3185 (1988).
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firearms.”12 This new statute provided: “It shall be unlawful for any
person to manufacture, enter into commerce, ship, transport, or
receive any toy, look-alike, or imitation firearm unless such firearm
contains, or has affixed to it, a marking approved by the Secretary
of Commerce.”13 The statute further required all imitation weap-
ons to have a “blaze orange plug” permanently inserted and re-
cessed no more than six millimeters from the end of the barrel.14
As is often true, the exceptions to the rule are more interesting
than the rule itself. The statute’s first exception allowed the Secre-
tary of Commerce to waive the marking requirement for weapons
used in the entertainment industry.15 Additionally, the statute pro-
vided the Secretary with the discretion to alter the marking rule
“after consulting with interested persons.”16
Further exceptions were made in the definition of “look-alike
firearm.” This term was “limited to toy guns, water guns, replica
non-guns, and air-soft guns firing nonmetallic projectiles,” the orig-
inal of which was manufactured after 1898.17 As for replicas of fire-
arms, the originals of which were developed before 1898, these
were not defined as “look-alike firearms.”18 Lastly, the term was not
applied to toy weapons that qualified as BB guns, pellet guns or
paintball guns, all of which use air pressure to fire a projectile.19
Importantly, the new statute required the Director of the Bu-
reau of Justice Statistics to conduct a study of the use of such fire-
arms in criminal enterprises and to review police reports regarding
their use.20 The Director of the National Institute of Justice was
also required to study the effectiveness of the required blaze-or-
ange markings in combat situations.21 In an effort to enhance con-
sistent applications, the statute contained a supremacy clause
invalidating state and local laws that were inconsistent with the
marking requirements provided by federal law or that prohibited
the sale of pre-1898 replicas or the traditional BB guns, pellet guns
12 Id. Clearly, Congress had to tie its regulation of toy weapons to its federal power
under the Commerce Clause, as the commission of a crime using a toy weapon would
fall under the jurisdiction of state law.
13 15 U.S.C. § 5001(a) (2000).
14 Id. § 5001(b)(1).
15 Id. § 5001(b)(2).
16 Id. § 5001(b)(3).
17 Id. § 5001(c).
18 Id. § 5001(c).
19 Id.
20 Id. § 5001(d).
21 Id. § 5001(e) (mismarked as a duplicate “c” in original).
266 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:263
or paintball guns.22
B. Department of Commerce Regulations
Pursuant to its statutory authority, the Department of Com-
merce instituted a rulemaking proceeding on the issue of the ap-
propriate markings.23 The Department of Commerce Technology
Administration held an open workshop attended by representatives
from trade associations, manufacturers and federal agencies,
among others, and also received written comments on the issue.24
Interestingly, the two most frequent comments were (1) that the
blaze orange recessed plug marking should be eliminated as inef-
fective, and (2) that realistic toy weapons should be banned en-
tirely.25 The Department of Commerce declined to act on either
suggestion. The Technology Administration noted that it was await-
ing the results of the technical evaluation of marking systems by
the National Institute of Justice, and would not eliminate the plug
requirement until reviewing that study.26 As to a complete ban on
toy weapons, it was noted that the statute did not provide the Sec-
retary of Commerce with that authority.27 The result was a final
rule set forth in the Federal Code of Regulations requiring look-
alike weapons to have either: (1) a blaze orange plug recessed no
more than six millimeters from the end of the barrel,28 or (2) for
look-alike firearms that emitted water, light or projectiles, a blaze
orange stripe around the circumference of the barrel,29 or (3) con-
struction of transparent or translucent materials so the contents of
the weapon could be identified,30 or (4) the entire exterior surface
coated in bright colors such as red, orange, yellow, green or blue,31
or (5) the entire exterior surface coated predominately white in
combination with another bright color such as red, orange, yellow,
green or blue.32 With relatively minor changes, this is how the reg-
ulations read today.33
22 Id. § 5001(g)(i–ii).
23 Marking of Toy, Look-Alike and Imitation Firearms, 54 Fed. Reg. 19,356 (May 5,
1989) (codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 1150 ) [hereinafter Commerce Regulations].
24 Id.
25 Id. at 19,356–57.
26 Id. at 19,357.
27 Id.
28 15 C.F.R. § 1150.3(a) (2008).
29 Id. § 1150.3(b).
30 Id. § 1150.3(c).
31 Id. § 1150.3(d).
32 Id. § 1150.3(e).
33 Id. § 1150.3(a–d). However, see Marking of Toy, Look-Alike, and Imitation Fire-
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C. Additional Legislative Efforts to Control Toy Guns
Despite the enactment of the Federal Toy Gun Law and the
promulgation of the marking regulations, the problem continues
to be discussed in Congress. The most recent effort was a bill re-
quiring the Consumer Product Safety Commission (“CPSC”) to
again address the issue of markings on toy and imitation firearms.34
Representative Edolphus Towns, who also triggered a General Ac-
counting Office investigation in 2003,35 sponsored the legislation,
which was subsequently referred to the Committee on Energy and
Commerce.36 The bill is very similar to the existing language in 15
U.S.C. § 5001, but would place the onus of regulating the markings
on the CPSC rather than the Secretary of Commerce,37 and would
supersede the Federal Energy Improvement Act of 1988, which es-
tablished 15 U.S.C. § 5001.38 This focus on transferring the regula-
tion of toy guns to the auspices of the CPSC can also be found in
the Committee on Energy and Commerce’s comments on the Con-
sumer Product Safety Modernization Act, where the CPSC was
asked to conduct a study regarding injuries and deaths caused by
toy guns and urged to adopt a rule providing for more distinctive
markings.39
III. FEDERAL DECISIONS REGARDING TOY GUNS
Approximately five months prior to the enactment of the fed-
eral regulations requiring identifying hues and markings for toy
weapons, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned that a toy
gun may be indistinguishable from a dangerous weapon and found
that replica or simulated weapons fall within the federal armed
bank robbery statute.40 Although the toy did not satisfy the defini-
tion of a firearm pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3), the Ninth Cir-
arms, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,451 (Oct. 26, 1992), for an explanation of additional rule
changes that are not relevant to this discussion.
34 H.R. 5471, 110th Cong. (2008).
35 See infra Part IV(C).
36 Rep. Towns also introduced a more drastic measure in 1999, H.R. 1280, 106th
Cong. (1999), which sought to declare “any toy which in size, shape, or overall ap-
pearance resembles a real handgun” as a banned hazardous product within the mean-
ing of the Consumer Product Safety Act. Id. This bill died in committee. In 2007, Rep.
Towns tried again to institute a ban on realistic-looking toy handguns as a “hazardous
product” within the meaning of the Consumer Product Safety Act. H.R. 428, 110th
Cong. (2007). This bill was also referred to committee.
37 H.R. 5471(a), 110th Cong. (2008).
38 H.R. 5471(d).
39 H.R. Rep. 110-501, at 47 (2007).
40 U.S. v. Martinez-Jimenez, 864 F.2d 664, 667–68 (9th Cir. 1989).
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cuit held that it did qualify as a “dangerous weapon or device”
prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d), thereby subjecting violators to
enhanced penalties.41
Neither Martinez-Jimenez nor his accomplice carried a genu-
ine weapon during the commission of the bank robbery for which
they were indicted.42 Three eyewitnesses testified, however, that the
object Martinez-Jimenez carried by his side as he ordered the em-
ployees and customers to lie down on the floor appeared to be a
handgun.43 While the defendant’s accomplice admitted that the
accused had purchased the toy gun at a department store a few
hours before the robbery, neither he nor the defendant wanted
the employees to believe that the toy was a genuine weapon nor
did either wish for the employees to fear for their lives.44 Rather,
the defendant testified that he carried the toy weapon because it
made him feel more secure.45 As proof of this assertion, the defen-
dant explained that he held the toy weapon down toward his leg to
hide it from view of the employees and customers.46
Notwithstanding the testimony of the defendant and his ac-
complice, the judge presiding over the bench trial found them
both guilty of armed bank robbery and sentenced them accord-
ingly.47 On appeal, the defendant argued unconvincingly that the
toy gun was a “harmless instrumentality of a crime” and not a “dan-
gerous weapon or device.”48 He reasoned that because the plastic
toy gun was not an inherently dangerous weapon and because the
defendant had never brandished it as such, the toy would not have
instilled fear in an average citizen and would not have created a
danger of a violent response.49 The Ninth Circuit disagreed.50
The appellate court relied almost exclusively on McLaughlin v.
41 Id. at 666.  The federal armed bank robbery statute provides in pertinent part:
Whoever, in committing or in attempting to commit, any offense de-
fined in subsections (a) and (b) of this section, assaults any person, or
puts in jeopardy the life of any person by the use of a dangerous weapon or
device, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
twenty-five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) (2000) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Armed Bank Robbery
Statute].
42 Martinez-Jimenez, 864 F.2d at 665.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 667.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 667–68.
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United States,51 the U.S. Supreme Court’s resolution of the eviden-
tiary conflict among the federal circuits regarding whether un-
loaded weapons were “dangerous” within the meaning of section
2113(d) of the Armed Bank Robbery Statute.52 In McLaughlin, the
Supreme Court held that an unloaded handgun satisfied the defi-
nition of “dangerous weapon or device” contained in the statute.53
Prior to McLaughlin, many circuits, including the Ninth Circuit, in-
terpreted “dangerous weapon or device” to include only loaded op-
erable weapons.54
McLaughlin placed greater emphasis on the burden that a de-
vice used in a bank robbery imposes upon its victims and law en-
forcement personnel.55 The Supreme Court reasoned that whether
a weapon or device is dangerous encompasses more than just the
object’s potential to injure people directly.56 The result is that
when a robber creates the appearance of physical danger, the rob-
ber has acted sufficiently to subject himself to the more stringent
punishment.57
The Martinez-Jimenez Court adopted this reasoning and analo-
gized the defendant’s employment of a toy weapon to Congress’s
debate over the use of a wooden gun referenced by the McLaughlin
Court.58 Consequently, if an inoperable wooden gun possessed the
potential to create a high-risk atmosphere when used in the com-
mission of a crime, the Martinez-Jimenez Court reasoned the same
would be true of an inoperable plastic weapon.59 By defining a toy
gun as a dangerous weapon, the Martinez-Jimenez Court expanded
the class of dangerous weapons encompassed by the Armed Bank
Robbery Statute—a liberal interpretation which was arguably
within the intent of Congress.60
51 476 U.S. 16 (1986).
52 Martinez-Jimenez, 864 F.2d at 666–67.
53 Id. at 666.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 667.
59 Id.
60 See McLaughlin v. United States, 476 U.S. 16, 18 (1986); see also Melissa Ellen
Dyan, Case Comment, Criminal Law—Dangerousness Is in the Eye of the Beholder—United
States v. Martinez-Jimenez, 864 F.2d 664 (9th Cir. 1989), 23 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1141,
1145–46 (1989) (asserting that expansion of the dangerous weapon category to in-
clude apparently dangerous weapons violated defendant’s due process rights by re-
lieving prosecution of burden of proving all elements of the crime).
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IV. STUDIES CONSIDERING TOY GUN ISSUES
A. The Toy Guns Report by the Bureau of Justice Statistics
The Bureau of Justice Statistics (“BJS”), an agency within the
Department of Justice, was identified in 15 U.S.C. § 5001 as the
administrative unit charged with conducting the “study of the crim-
inal misuse of toy, look-alike and imitation firearms, including
studying police reports of such incidences and reporting on such
incidences relative to marked and unmarked firearms.”61 To that
end, the BJS awarded a cooperative agreement to the Police Execu-
tive Research Forum to conduct the study with the following goals
defined: “document[ing] (a) the number of crimes committed by
persons using imitation guns and (b) the number of confronta-
tions by police with persons who had imitation guns which were
either thought to be or purported to be real.”62
The investigators began framing the methodology for the
study by reviewing news stories reporting toy gun incidents.63 Based
on the trends appearing in these reports, the investigators were
able to develop a basis for data collection through two methods: a
survey and site visits at police agencies.64
The researchers distributed the questionnaire on police ex-
periences with toy guns to police departments serving populations
in excess of 50,000 people, sheriffs’ departments with sworn em-
ployees numbering in excess of 100, and the primary state police
agencies.65 The survey resulted in a usable response rate of
65.5%.66 The survey questions targeted police experiences with im-
itation weapons in situations requiring an officer’s use of force, as
well as robberies and assaults.67 The survey defined three catego-
ries of imitation weapons: toy guns, replica guns, and BB/pellet/
starter guns.68 The investigators also conducted site visits at twenty-
seven separate law enforcement agencies for the purpose of exam-
ining imitation weapons incidents in detail to establish trends and
characteristics of such encounters.69
The report found that over a four-year period between 1985
and 1989, 65.5% of the study population reported 5654 robberies
61 15 U.S.C. § 5001(d) (2000).
62 BJS SURVEY, supra note 4, at vii.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id. at vii–viii.
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using imitation guns; robbery investigators interviewed have esti-
mated that approximately fifteen percent of all robberies are com-
mitted using imitation guns.70 During the same period, 8128
assaults were committed using imitation guns, and 31,650 imitation
guns were confiscated as a result of their involvement with a crime
or other incident.71 Further, 1128 incidents were reported where
an officer threatened to use force, and 252 reported cases involv-
ing actual use of force where the officer was confronted with an
imitation weapon.72  Although the site interviews and survey com-
ments indicated that some incidents involved imitation guns with
markings, there was insufficient data either to establish the propor-
tion of marked imitation guns versus unmarked imitation guns, or
to distinguish between types of imitation weapons.73
With regard to the blaze orange recessed plug required by 15
U.S.C. § 5001, every officer interviewed by the investigators be-
lieved that it was inadequate.74 Some (officers and investigators)
expressed the view that the blaze orange markings could be easily
altered with paint.75 Others noted that the inherent circumstances
of a gun-related incident were so stressful for an officer and in-
volved so many factors that a blaze orange plug would not com-
mand attention.76 Finally, standard police firearms training taught
all officers to assume that any weapon held by a suspect was real
and should be treated as life-threatening.77
The report concluded that it was difficult to precisely evaluate
the seriousness of the problem because the proportion of incidents
where an imitation gun was used was relatively small in comparison
to the nationwide number of violent crimes and officer-involved
shootings, notwithstanding the often tragic circumstances sur-
rounding toy gun incidents.78 The researchers quoted a police
chief participant who suggested that the best solution to the prob-
lem was education: the use of violence and threats of force were
not acceptable ways to resolve the issues presented.79
70 Id. at viii.
71 Id. at viii–ix.
72 Id. at ix.
73 Id. at x.
74 Id. at 37.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 38.
77 Id. at 39–40.
78 Id. at 41.
79 Id.
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B. Technical Evaluation of Marking Systems by National Institute of
Justice
The second study required by Congress pursuant to 15 U.S.C.
§ 5001 was a requirement that the National Institute of Justice
(“NIJ”) “conduct a technical evaluation of the marking systems
provided for [in the statute] to determine their effectiveness in po-
lice combat situations.”80
Upon receiving its statutory mandate, the NIJ began its study
by hiring an independent researcher to design an experiment that
would “evaluate the various toy gun markings using active police
officers in simulated confrontations with armed assailants.”81 The
FBI assisted by providing the use of its “Hogan’s Alley” training
facility,82 participating in the design of the test and course, and
recruiting volunteers from the academy classes. Additional test sub-
jects were volunteers from police departments in the Washington,
D.C., metropolitan area. In all, there were eighty-nine officers who
participated in the study.83
The experiment pitted each test subject police officer against
an armed assailant who confronted the officer. The assailant would
walk out of an alley onto the sidewalk, turn towards the police of-
ficer, raise a weapon and pull the trigger. These confrontations
were staged at distances of fifteen and thirty feet.84
The assailants were armed with any one of the following: an
accurate replica 45-caliber pistol; an accurate replica 45-caliber pis-
tol with a blaze orange plug in the barrel; a 45-caliber replica water
pistol with a blaze orange band around the barrel; an orange and
purple Berretta replica water pistol; a white Berretta replica water
pistol; or a transparent green Ingram MAC 11 replica water pistol.
These test pistols corresponded with the five marking options
under the commerce regulations.85
The test subject police officers were not told the objective of
the experiment, but were instructed to behave as they normally
80 15 U.S.C. § 5001(e) (2000) (mismarked as a duplicate “c” in original).
81 NAT’L INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, TEST OF THE VISIBILITY OF TOY AND REPLICA HAND-
GUN MARKINGS 1 (1989) [hereinafter NIJ TEST].
82 Hogan’s Alley is a simulated village center complete with houses, a motel, a
theater, a post office, a bank, etc., which is used for FBI Academy training in defensive
tactics, investigative techniques, and firearm skills. Id. at 3.
83 Id. at 1–2.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 3–4. The unmarked replicas were extremely realistic and firearms instruc-
tors from the FBI could not distinguish them from real weapons except by close
examination.
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would in a street confrontation, with the exception that they would
not seek cover to protect themselves. The officers went through the
course one at a time. They were instructed that the scenario called
for them to be responding to a call from the dispatcher to investi-
gate a report of an armed prowler. They were further told that the
suspect would appear from an alleyway and point a weapon at the
officer; the police officer was to fire his own revolver if he felt his
life was in danger.86
The people playing the role of assailant recorded the informa-
tion on whether the officer fired and who fired first. The officers
were escorted back to the classroom area for debriefing after un-
dergoing eight separate confrontations with the assailants in both
daytime and nighttime conditions.87
The test results were fairly conclusive with respect to some of
the markings and less conclusive as to others. Ninety-eight percent
of the officers fired at the assailants holding the “real” weapon.88
However, 96% fired at seeing the weapon with the orange plug.89
Seventy-seven percent fired at the gun marked with the orange
band around the barrel.90 Fifty-nine percent fired upon seeing the
white colored pistol.91 Fifty-six percent of the officers fired at the
orange and purple pistol, while the clear green pistol had the low-
est rate of firing response at thirty-three percent.92
There were some additional remarks by the officers during the
debriefing that were of great interest to the outcome of the study.
Most alarming was the fact that 40% of the officers fired at every
assailant irrespective of the markings on the weapon being held.93
Some explained that they were primarily concerned about the ag-
gressive behavior of the assailant and the failure to respond to or-
ders not to move.94 Some of these officers felt that they should fire
on anyone who pointed a weapon and failed to obey commands,
regardless of the markings on the weapon, because the assailant
could have painted the gun to look like a toy.95 Several of the of-
ficers never saw the orange plug or band during the nighttime
86 Id. at 7.
87 Id. at 9.
88 Id. at 16.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 22.
94 Id. at 22. During the exercise the police shouted “Police! Don’t move!” The
assailants were instructed to disregard the order and raise the weapon as if to fire.
95 Id. at 22–23.
274 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:263
tests.96 Some officers who fired when confronted with the white-
colored weapon stated that it looked like a stainless steel or nickel-
plated handgun.97
On the positive side, the study suggested that under more re-
laxed conditions or where the officers were permitted to take
cover, the officers may have been less likely to fire.98 Further, a
“learning effect” produced lower shooting rates, which led re-
searchers to conclude that increased familiarity of the officers with
the marking systems would lead to fewer decisions to fire.99
The report concluded that the orange plug marking was a
complete failure, while the orange band was only a little better.100
The other colored markings were somewhat more effective. How-
ever, the report observed that the effectiveness of the marking sys-
tems would be increased if the police were familiarized with
them.101 Further, private citizens in “at risk” occupations, such as
bank tellers, should also be familiarized with the markings.102
C. GAO Report on Toy Gun Issues
In 2003, the General Accounting Office (“GAO”),103 the inves-
tigatory agency for the Congressional branch, was asked by Repre-
sentative Edolphus Towns to:
(1) examine crime statistics showing the prevalence of crimes
that involved toy guns in some capacity; (2) gather any available
information on incidents involving toy guns that have resulted
in injuries or deaths, whether or not related to criminal activity;
and (3) determine from available literature whether there are
any studies examining the long-term impacts that can be attrib-
uted to toy gun play by children.104
96 Id. at 24.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id. The learning effect was demonstrated by the fact that the officers were more
likely to shoot when confronted with a toy gun during the first trial, but less likely to
fire after they became familiar with the setting and the possibility of the appearance
of a toy gun. Id. at 27.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 The GAO Human Capital Reform Act of 2004 changed the name of the agency
to the Government Accountability Office. See Pub. L. No. 108-271, 118 Stat. 814 (codi-
fied as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 702–83 (Supp. 2008)). The change was made to
“better reflect our current role and mission in government.” U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTA-
BILITY OFF., GOA-07-1188CG, TRANSFORMING GOVERNMENT TO MEET THE DEMANDS OF
THE 21ST CENTURY 7 (2007).
104 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFF., GAO-03-1135R, INFORMATION GENERALLY NOT
AVAILABLE ON TOY GUN ISSUES RELATED TO CRIME, INJURIES OR DEATHS, AND LONG-
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The GAO began its analysis with the observation that the focus
of its study was limited to imitation toy guns and excluded projec-
tile firing toys such as BB, pellet and paintball guns.105 The GAO
also engaged in literature review, rather than conducting its own
experiments. The study consisted of a review of internet and elec-
tronic resources to locate statistics, reports, studies and other publi-
cations, in addition to contacting federal agencies such as the
Bureau of Justice Statistics, the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, and the Consumer Product Safety Commission.106 Vari-
ous academic researchers were interviewed, as well as the counsel
for the Toy Industry Association.107
The GAO concluded that “scant data exist[s]” regarding ei-
ther incidents involving toy guns or the long term effect that play-
ing with imitation weapons have on children. Further, the sole
study on crime and toy guns that had been conducted in 1989 by
the Bureau of Justice Statistics was “dated and insufficient for pro-
viding a national perspective.”108
With respect to the BJS study, the GAO noted that the infor-
mation provided regarding the response rate, even though 65.5%
did not include information “on whether the nonrespondents dif-
fered in significant ways from the respondents.”109 In the absence
of this information, it was impossible to conclude that the findings
were not distorted by a lack of response from 34% of the police
agencies.110
Further, it was considered problematic that police reporting
systems were not coded to record the use of toy or imitation weap-
ons in criminal activity.111 The responses were therefore based on
either manual records checks or on officer recall.112 Accordingly,
the GAO believed that there was either an underreporting or over-
reporting of incidents involving toy guns.113
Finally, the GAO observed that the BJS report itself noted its
shortcomings when it admittedly could not answer the question re-
garding the seriousness of the problem, but instead stated that
TERM IMPACT 1 (2003) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. For an explanation of the discrep-
ancy in the name of the issuing agency, see note 103.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 11.
110 Id. at 2.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id.
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“[t]he response is a value judgment based upon one’s ideology and
experience.”114
V. DISCUSSION
Despite the flurry of legislative attempts to remedy the prob-
lem of toy guns, it continues to be an issue.115 People continue to
either use them in the commission of crimes or to die or become
injured when police mistake toy guns for the real thing. The Anti-
Violence Campaign lists fifty-five incidents of toy gun usage be-
tween 1983 and 2008, many of which resulted in the death of the
person carrying the toy weapon, however innocently.116 However,
this information is merely anecdotal and does not reflect a scien-
tific effort to evaluate the true magnitude of the problem.
The state of the law at the present point is quite clear. Toy
manufacturers may make realistic-looking handguns that are availa-
ble for sale to the general public, as long as the toys have a marking
conforming to the Department of Commerce regulations: a blaze
orange plug or band at the barrel, or the entire gun may be trans-
lucent, white or brightly colored.117 As previously noted, it is very
easy to change the appearance of the weapon using a can of spray
paint.118 Unlike real weapons, people can obtain toy guns without
undergoing a criminal background check or waiting period as oth-
erwise required under federal law.119 Accordingly, it is easier for a
would-be bank robber to accomplish such a crime with a toy gun,
instead of going to the expense and risk of obtaining a real hand-
gun. It is of little comfort that use of even a toy gun in the commis-
sion of a bank robbery will result in the perpetrator being
subjected to stiffer federal penalties under the Armed Bank Rob-
bery Statute because the toy would be considered a “dangerous
weapon” within the meaning of the statute.120 What is problematic
is that the Federal Toy Gun Law does nothing to address the issue
of the ease with which would-be criminals can obtain toy weapons,
many of which are realistic copies of actual weapons. Com-
pounding the problem is that the marking system provided under
114 Id. at 11.
115 See supra notes 11, 13, and 34 and accompanying text.
116 International Health & Epidemiology Research Center, Fact Sheet About Toy
Guns (2008), http://www.irol.com/avc/Fact_Sheet_About_Toy_Guns.html.
117 15 C.F.R. § 1150.3(a)–(d) (2008).
118 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
119 See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 921–31 (2000).
120 Armed Bank Robbery Statute, supra note 41.
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the Department of Commerce regulations is ineffective to alert law
enforcement personnel or others to the presence of a toy.
The weakness of the commerce regulations was readily appar-
ent to many of the persons or organizations that commented on
the proposed regulations when they suggested eliminating the
blaze orange plug.121 Interestingly, the Commerce Department de-
flected this criticism by stating that they were awaiting the results of
the National Institute of Justice report on the effectiveness of the
markings before taking that action.122 However, the Commerce De-
partment did not wait to review the report before passing their fi-
nal rule, which was effective May 5, 1989.123 The National Institute
of Justice had not been dilatory in conducting its testing of the
markings; the report was issued in August 1989, four months after
the issuance of the final regulations.124 Even after the NIJ Study was
issued, clearly concluding that the markings were ineffective, the
Department of Commerce never amended the regulations to elimi-
nate the ineffective markings. The Department even had the op-
portunity to do so in 1992, when they revised the regulations to
permit additional bright colors as marking alternatives, among
other changes.125 Consequently, the Commerce Department failed
to satisfy its statutory duty to adopt a rule providing for distinctive
markings of toy guns.
With respect to the GAO Report, the agency did not really
provide the information Representative Towns requested. The
GAO was asked to examine crime statistics involving toy guns and
gather information on injuries and deaths related to the use of toy
guns.126 However, they did nothing more than perform a literature
review and contact other agencies to inquire about their knowl-
edge of the issue. They were furnished the Bureau of Justice Statis-
tics Report researching the number and type of incidents relating
to criminal involvement with toy guns, which they criticized as un-
121 See Commerce Regulations, supra note 23; supra note 25 and accompanying text.
122 See Commerce Regulations, supra note 23; supra note 26 and accompanying text.
123 Commerce Regulation, supra note 23.
124 NIJ TEST, supra note 81, at vii. Although the Federal Toy Gun Law provisions
were passed on November 5, 1988, they did not become effective until six months
after passage. Federal Energy Management Improvement Act of 1988§ 4(f), Pub. L.
No. 100-615, 102 Stat. 3185 (1988). Further, the Commerce Secretary was specifically
authorized to make changes to the marking system “after consulting with interested
persons.” Id. § 4(b)(3). The Commerce Department issued their final rule after only
hearing comments produced in response to their March 14, 1989 Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking. 54 Fed. Reg. 19,356 (May 5, 1989). Many of these public comments were
critical of the blaze orange plug. Id. at 19,356–57.
125 57 Fed. Reg. 48,451 (Oct. 26, 1992).
126 GAO REPORT, supra note 104, at 1.
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reliable due to response rate issues and the fallibility of officers’
memories in recalling toy gun incidents.127 They also concluded
that there were no reliable databases to capture such information,
including the National Electronic Injury Surveillance System, the
Death Certificate System, or the Incident Database, administered
by the Consumer Product Safety Commission.128
What the GAO Report noticeably failed to do was make any
suggestion on what could be done to revise the existing laws and
regulations on toy guns to make them more effective, or to advise
how data regarding toy guns could be more effectively captured.
Interestingly, the GAO Report entirely omitted any mention of the
National Institute of Justice test on the marking systems. It appears
the GAO gave Representative Towns’ request only passing interest
and made the narrowest interpretation of its mission.
Despite its noted lack of reliability, the Bureau of Justice Statis-
tics report is the only data available. Based on that report, in a four
and a half year period, 458 police departments reported 5654 rob-
beries (approximately fifteen percent of all robberies) and 8128
assaults committed with imitation weapons.129 Further, 31,650 of
these imitation guns were seized by police during this period of
time because of their involvement in some kind of incident.130 Fi-
nally, 1128 incidents were reported by 186 police departments in
which officers threatened to use force in the belief that an imita-
tion gun was real.131 There were 252 incidents where force was ac-
tually used against imitation weapons.132 Whether these figures
represent underreporting or overreporting, as the GAO com-
mented, they still represent a significant use of toy guns in crime
within the country overall.133
However, quibbling over the reliability of statistics is meaning-
less in the face of the true import of both the Bureau of Justice
report and the National Institute of Justice testing: police officers
are not trained to distinguish between real and toy weapons.134
The police officers interviewed for the Bureau of Justice report
127 Id. at 3.
128 Id.
129 BJS SURVEY, supra note 4, at viii.
130 Id. at viii–ix.
131 Id. at ix.
132 Id.
133 Id. According to the BJS Survey, the survey was sent to police departments cover-
ing over one-third of the nation’s population, with a response rate of 65.5%. If the
response statistics are reflective of the nation as a whole, the actual number of toy
guns involved in crime would be substantial. Id. at 2.
134 Id. at 39; NIJ TEST, supra note 81, at 22.
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were questioned whether further training on the marking systems
would be of assistance in encounters with toy weapons.135 The uni-
form response was that police officers are trained to assume that all
apparent weapons are real and represent a threat to the officer’s
safety, regardless of the age or sex of the person wielding the per-
ceived weapon.136 This view is supported by the data in the Na-
tional Institute of Justice test, which found that forty percent of all
officers fired at every pistol they encountered, regardless of mark-
ings.137 Although one officer in the Hogan’s Alley test remarked
that he withheld fire because he had read a handout describing the
marking system, others observed that “they fired even when they
realized that the weapon was a toy because they felt that any sus-
pect could paint a real handgun to look like a toy.”138 Clearly,
markings will be of no use unless officers are trained to recognize
them, but such training could also endanger the lives of the of-
ficers when encountering a painted handgun.139
The logical conclusion to draw is that the only effective solu-
tion to the toy gun dilemma is a complete ban on realistic toy
weapons, such as that proposed long ago by Representative
Towns.140 However, there is simply not enough hard data to justify
such a ban. These toy gun incidents obviously do occur, but the
frequency and severity of the incidents is unknown. A more rigor-
ous study is required to assess the seriousness of the problem.
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite these further federal attempts to control toy gun
safety, nothing has been successful. Clearly, the National Institute
of Justice study on the effectiveness of the blaze orange plug or
band markings demonstrate that they are virtually useless in police
combat situations.141 Although the Department of Commerce reg-
ulations provide for alternative markings such as bright colors over
the entire toy weapon, toy manufacturers are not required to adopt
these measures and can opt for the less effective markings.142 Be-
135 BJS SURVEY, supra note 4, at 39.
136 Id. at 39–40.
137 NIJ TEST, supra note 81, at 22.
138 Id. at 24.
139 This is not an unrealistic assumption as gun specialty stores will paint custom
colors on guns, including hot pink, camouflage, and the American flag. See, e.g., Jim’s
Gun Supply, http://www.jimsgunsupply.com/index2.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2008).
140 See supra note 34.
141 NIJ TEST, supra note 81, at 24.
142 15 C.F.R. § 1150 (2009).
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cause children want to play with the “real thing” toy manufacturers
are more likely to use the most minimal markings.
As concluded by the Bureau of Justice Statistics Report, one’s
view of the seriousness of the problem depends on the personal
attitude of the individual.143 On the one hand, it can be argued
that the relatively few incidents where a toy is mistaken for a
weapon, even if the result is the tragic death of a child, does not
justify a complete ban on toy and imitation weapons that would
deprive the rest of the child population of the pleasure of playing
cops and robbers with realistic props.144 Of course, the toy industry
would lose a sizeable amount of revenue in the wake of such a ban,
which may explain the active participation of toy industry repre-
sentatives in the formation of the Commerce Department regula-
tions that are so ineffective.145
On the other hand, one can argue that the loss of even one
life is sufficient to invoke a ban on imitation weapons.146 Nothing is
more precious than the safety of children. Further, even though
there is scant literature on the subject, one study suggests that toy
gun play among children is associated with increased real aggres-
sion in play settings.147 Arguably, this increase in aggressive behav-
ior can lead to increases in criminal behavior in later years.
Another justification for such a ban is the reverse of a typical inci-
dent, where a child familiar with realistic toy weapons mistakes a
real gun for a toy and shoots himself or a friend.148 There have
been many examples of this type of incident.
It is impossible to make an informed decision about this seri-
ous issue without sufficient information. First, changes in the injury
and crime reporting databases should be made so that incidents
involving toy guns can be tracked to determine the actual scope of
the problem. If the data demonstrates a significant occurrence of
toy weapon related crime or injury, a total ban of these toys may be
143 BJS SURVEY, supra note 4, at 41.
144 Id.
145 The first public workshop held by the Department of Commerce in February
1989 was attended by forty “representatives of trade associations, manufacturers, im-
porters, distributors, and Federal Agencies.” Commerce Regulations, supra note 23.
See also Marking of Toy, Look-Alike, and Imitation Firearms, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,451,
48,452 (Oct. 26, 1992).
146 BJS SURVEY, supra note 4, at 41.
147 See GAO REPORT, supra note 104, at 5 (citing Malcolm W. Watson and Ying
Peng, Brandeis University, The Relation Between Toy Gun Play and Children’s Aggressive
Behavior, 3 EARLY EDUC. & DEV. 370, Oct. 1992).
148 International Health & Epidemiology Research Center, Fact Sheet About Toy
Guns (2008), http://www.irol.com/avc/Fact_Sheet_About_Toy_Guns.html.
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advisable. Second, a study should be conducted regarding police
weapons and tactical training procedures to determine whether
there is any marking or warning system that will be sufficient to
preserve the lives of the officers who are placed in the difficult po-
sition of deciding whether a gun is real or a toy. If not, there is
arguably more justification for a complete ban. However, that is a
decision that should not be made based on either anecdotal evi-
dence or the financial interest of the toy industry.

